

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**“SHAPING THE FUTURE” – A NEW PROFILE OF THE ALBANIAN MILITARY  
OFFICER**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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Post-Cold War political, economic, military, demographic, environmental and technological developments have significantly influenced the global, regional and national security environment. The start of the new century finds a globalized but unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which inter-and intra-national conflicts, oppression, terrorism and poverty co-exist with peace, democracy, stability, and prosperity. The Albanian Document of National Military Strategy (ADNMS) correctly states: "nowhere are these conditions more evident than in the geopolitical arena in which the Republic of Albania finds itself, sitting immediately astride the crossroads of eastern and western civilization and culture in the Balkan Peninsula." Such challenges require senior military leaders that are prepared to protect and advance Albanian interests in the new security environment. This paper defines the characteristics of such a senior officer corps and proposes an educational strategy for developing them.



## “SHAPING THE FUTURE” – A NEW PROFILE OF THE ALBANIAN MILITARY OFFICER

### A Great School...

You go to a great school not so much for knowledge as much as for arts and habits; for the habits of attention, for the art of expression, for the art of assuming at a moment's notice a new intellectual position, for the art of entering quickly into another person's thoughts, for the habit of submitting to censure and refutation, for the art of indicating assent or dissent in graduated terms, for the habit of regarding minute points of accuracy, for the art of working out what is possible in a given time; for taste, for discrimination, for mental courage and for mental soberness. Above all, you go to a great school for self knowledge.

- William Johnson Cory,  
Poet, Classicist, and Historian,  
Assistant Master of Eton for over a quarter a century

The events of September 11, 2001 emphasized the nature of the new global security environment. It was September 11, that “changed ...and effected a brutally sudden end to the brief post-Cold War era.”<sup>1</sup> September 11, a “wake – up call” for the “functioning core”, is representative of the new security challenges confronting the developed world and Albania in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>2</sup> A critical question is how will Albania ensure its security interests? For Albania, the fall of Berlin Wall was critically important, because it gave Albania the opportunity to think of the world as a single place. As the Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen put it: “The Berlin Wall was not only a symbol of keeping people inside Germany; it was a way of preventing a kind of global view of our future.”<sup>3</sup> Post-Cold War political, economic, military, demographic, environmental and technological developments have significantly influenced the global, regional and national security environment. The start of the new century finds a globalized but unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which inter-and intra-national conflicts, oppression, terrorism and poverty co-exist with peace, democracy, stability, and prosperity. The Albanian Document of National Military Strategy (ADNMS) correctly states: “nowhere are these conditions more evident than in the geopolitical arena in which the Republic of Albania finds itself, sitting immediately astride the crossroads of eastern and western civilization and culture in the Balkan Peninsula.”<sup>4</sup> Such challenges require senior military leaders that are prepared to protect and advance Albanian interests in the new security environment. This paper defines the characteristics of such a senior officer corps and proposes an educational strategy for developing them.

## The Need for a New Approach to Officer Education and Training

The Albanian National Security Strategy (ANSS) captures the nature of the new security environment, stating that:

...the most difficult and immediate external threat facing Albanian security planners is the revival of historic regional conflicts fueled by ethnic, religious, political extremism, as well as external state-supported terrorism. Additionally, internationally organized crime, illicit trafficking, as well as natural and man-made disasters, have the potential to destabilize Balkan security as the effect of these issues combine to erode the popular legitimacy of regional governments.<sup>5</sup>

This strategy clearly aligns Albania with the functioning core, supporting peace, stability, and economically viable democratic governance. Derived from the Albanian NSS, a specific national objective is advanced in the National Military Strategy which is to promote cooperation and integration with like-minded nations. Since the integration of Albania into the Euro-Atlantic security organizations is a primary concept to support the national security objective, the Albanian Armed Forces must be capable of full integration and interoperability with the military forces of NATO. Successful accomplishment of this objective will require the adoption of compatible force structures, doctrines, capabilities, and eventually, technologies. "The Albanian Armed Forces must be fully capable of operating in a wide range of complex combined and joint scenarios in concert with the military forces of NATO and other coalition partners. The establishment and full accomplishment of Albania's NATO Partnership Goals is a fundamental priority."<sup>6</sup> In his introduction to the publication of the National Military Strategy, Albanian President Alfred Moisiu emphasizes that "integration of our country into Euro-Atlantic security structures is a primary strategic objective and the Military Strategy gives first priority to the development of a realistic, affordable and highly trained professional force to face current and future security challenges."<sup>7</sup> In the same statement, he introduced the "Development of the Armed Forces 2010 Objective Force" as a new way of military thinking and as a mid and long term plan to reform, reorganize and modernize Albanian Armed Forces for their new role.<sup>8</sup> These strategic commitments require an appropriate senior military leadership, one that can function as an integrated part of the military of the "functioning core", advance Albania's interests, and meet the obligations of a military in a democratic society.

Achieving the 2010 Objective Force will require substantial effort on the part of leaders at every level. Both the ANSS and ADNMS provide focus for such efforts and identify the critical steps needed to properly carry out the tasks of organizing, manning, equipping and training, stationing, sustaining, and resourcing the Objective Force. Thus, the strategies represent the road map for the future of the Albanian Armed Forces in the new reality of the 21st century

security environment characterized as Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA).<sup>9</sup> This environment creates a new challenging range of objectives for the military which require a new kind of senior military leader. This requirement for a new officer corps is similar to that of raising a new building. A new building needs new raw materials, because as an old Albanian saying goes “You cannot build a new house with old bricks and old woodwork.” Such an undertaking requires thorough reform, and reform in the final analysis is not about buying new equipment and new computers. Such reform, in essence, is about changing mindsets—new values, new approaches, and new fundamental ways of thinking. These fall ultimately under the domain of education. New system of values and new ways of thinking begin with new pillars of education. And education in general—more specifically, a military one—does not exist in a vacuum. Nor is it jewelry that one should wear to simply look better. Such an education is designed to create a particular product with specific attributes, skills, and competencies that ensure achievement of the nation’s security objectives. Thus, before designing and building an education system—in this case a military system—one should determine the characteristics of the final “product”, the new senior military leader.

Fortunately, the nature of an officer’s corps in a democratic society has been solved already by our NATO allies. American success in this regard has been argued by some to be the successful melding of personal ambition and professional development in a democratic military. The analysis suggests in a broad sense that if the personnel system selects and rewards those who seek appropriate professional development and education, a quality senior leadership will emerge.<sup>10</sup> The question then is what are the most desired attributes, skills, and competencies?

#### Attributes, Skills, and Competencies Required in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century senior Officer

What kind of senior leader is needed at the strategic level? The answer to this question defines the education system required to develop him over time. In this author’s opinion, a simple way to describe attributes and qualities that a leader should possess is found in the genius of Karl von Clausewitz. His timeless description of qualities is valid for all levels of leadership and touches the core of the issues in a few words: “...two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.”<sup>11</sup> Simply stated, these qualities are hard to find and in the modern world can only be achieved through the selection and promotion of quality officers.

Since the military is a profession, many scholars and militaries have sought to define what Clausewitz's two qualities mean today. In an effort to define the most desired attributes of 21st-century leaders, the United States Army War College surveyed 432 generals and promotable colonels

to learn what traits they felt would be required of senior officers in the following five to 15 years. The respondents named such attributes as flexibility, adaptability, communicative skill, political astuteness, ability to conceptualize, skill in dealing with officials from different governmental cultures, diplomacy, skill in resource management, cultural sensitivity, caring leadership, and a full range of technical, tactical, war fighting, joint, and coalition competencies. No one can quarrel with the inclusion of any of these attributes; indeed, most would have expected them in military leaders serving ten or even 25 years ago.<sup>12</sup>

Combining these results with other resources, the U.S. Army War College has captured a comprehensive picture of the attributes, skills, and competencies of strategic leaders in its "Strategic Leadership Primer."<sup>13</sup> This Primer provides its comprehensive list under the simple rubrics of Be, Know, Do. Although the comprehensive attributes listed in those rubrics are meant for leaders at the strategic level, they are mature attributes built up through development along the whole spectrum of leadership.<sup>14</sup> These rubrics portray the leader as a person that can serve as: a master of the relations between ends, ways, and means; a bearer of high moral standards; a visionary proactive thinker; a good manager; and a skilled diplomat. (Figure 1)




Figure 1: The Strategic Leader



### Issues with the Initial Post-Cold War System

In the initial post-cold war system, the vast majority of the officers in the Albanian Armed Forces received their commissions by completing one of the three services' military academies (Army, Air Force, and Navy).<sup>15</sup> The mission of the Albanian military academies is "to prepare, train, and qualify officers and specialists dedicated to the defense of Albania and to the execution of duties sanctioned by law."<sup>16</sup> Another source for the officer candidates are civilian universities' graduates who are seeking a military career. Candidates for the academies are screened academically and physically, and selected competitively; they attend a three year program, which provides a commission but not a college-equivalent degree. Those recruited from civilian universities attend an abbreviated one-year program, which leads to a commission. Continuing military education is conducted by the Defense Academy through courses in military doctrine, military history, national security, and defense policies. In addition, the Albanian Defense Academy provides a General Staff course for senior officers. While a step forward, the current system falls short of what is needed.

Coming out of the Cold War in early 90's, Albanian society entered a difficult process of transition and this was reflected in military education as well. In the first years, the Albanian Ministry of Defense shut down all the military academies in an effort to reform the Armed Forces and their education and training. In 1995-1996 Albanian military academies were re-opened with three-year military education programs. Although the military academies adopted a new structure and curriculum, they could not escape from the legacy of the long period under a totalitarian-communist regime. As a result, the reforms were inadequate. Three aspects stand out in this failure:

- First, the reforms failed to produce a single, sound concept for military officer education. The three services' academies did not identify the new requirements for a 21<sup>st</sup> century Albanian military officer corps, and the education philosophy essential to meet these requirements. Consequently, they ended up refining the concepts of the old system without changing the essence of it.
- Second, the reforms failed to properly address the serious lack of a professional non-commissioned officer corps and its indispensable role in a modern military. The military education system remained under the influence of the old, harmful tradition in which officers concentrate more on narrow technical knowledge than on the requirements of 21<sup>st</sup> century leadership. In contrast, modern militaries delegate much of the technical role to non-commissioned specialists and focus officer education more on leadership issues.

- Third, the reforms failed to provide a college-equivalent degree. Although the reform foresaw the need for the young graduates/officers of the academies to attend a civilian university after graduation and acquire bachelor degrees, it was not realistic. Sending all the young lieutenants straight away to attend civilian universities was not supportable because it would have prolonged their service four more years and therefore was both unattainable and unaffordable.

The inadequacy of the reforms is evident in officer retention. Some 300 young lieutenants graduated from this military education system at the pre-commissioning level during the period 1998–2002. Of this cohort, in 2002, 150 still served in different units in the Albanian Armed Forces, 40 were involved in university or college studies full time, and about 100 of them had left the military service for good.<sup>17</sup> Retention of young officers in the Albanian Armed Forces is a very serious problem. Poor retention distorts the normal flow of the officer corps quality through the promotion pyramid, invalidating the whole system of officer personnel management in the military. While economic, political, social, and legal reasons influenced this phenomenon; the military education system with its lack of attractiveness and archaic composure contributed significantly to this exodus.

The Albanian Defense Academy, responsible for the education of senior military officers, adopted a similar pattern to the Albanian military academies. Since its creation in May 1958, the Albanian Defense Academy has been a joint military institution, and rightly so, taking into account the size of Albania and its Armed Forces. It remains an all service education institution to this day. From 1993 until 1998, the Albanian Ministry of Defense interrupted the courses in the Defense Academy in an effort to reform senior military officer education. During the years of reformation, the leadership of the Defense Academy consulted with a variety of similar western (NATO) institutions. The decision taken at that time was to adopt and implement the German system of senior military education. More precisely, the Defense Academy adopted the model of the German Armed Forces College in Hamburg.<sup>18</sup> The newly designed “General Staff Course” prepares senior military leaders. The duration of the course is two years. Compared to the American Army Officer Education System, it is like bringing together in one course the Command and General Staff Course (CGSC) and the Army War College Resident Course. Although the new Albanian General Staff Course is an achievement to be applauded, it also failed to escape the old regime legacy.<sup>19</sup>

The course is offered to promotable Majors and Lieutenant Colonels. It focuses on the tactical level in order to compensate for the lost years and does not significantly address the strategic level. In short, the course fails to prepare the future senior leaders with the necessary

knowledge and skills and a broader perspective required to deal with the ambiguity of the 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment. In part, the choice for this two-year model was driven more by the need to justify the similarities with the old system rather than from a thorough analysis of how to support the new profile of the Albanian senior military leader. The specialized working group, which advised the Albanian MoD and General Staff in regard to this choice, failed to see the future. They also failed to understand that military education does not live in isolation. Democratic military education must be a reflection of a given society in general, and an integral part of the nation's overall education system. Military education is an indication of the level of maturity of civil-military relations and the level of political and democratic culture within a society.<sup>20</sup> It must meet the professional needs, attract the people required, and support Albania's national values. Clearly, the advisers had not read Martin Van Creveld's book on officers' training and his evaluation of the high Soviet military education system.<sup>21</sup> They fell into the trap of judging the education system only by its length and the status of the faculty, missing both the big picture of the overall security requirements and the bonds that keep together a coherent philosophy of military education in a democratic society.

Another major problem that faces the Albanian Military Education System is the lack of interim continuing professional training. The transition of Albanian society and the apathy accompanying the efforts to find a place for the military profession in the initial post-Cold War security environment left their imprints strongly in military training and education. In the confusion, officer professional training at the Officer Basic Course and Advanced Officer Training Course were left to amateurish and ad-hoc solutions.<sup>22</sup> Although the Ministry of Defense decided to establish a new Training and Doctrine Command in 2001, continuing military training for officers is not yet institutionalized and is still far from being integrated with military education as a whole.<sup>23</sup> Hence, if Albania is to develop quality senior military leaders, the whole officer training and education system must be reconsidered.

#### What System Supports the New Senior Leader?

Before answering the question of what system is needed, it is important to clarify the differences between training and education. Although it is not always easy to offer a clear cut definition to describe those differences, scholar Robert H. Dorf seems to come close when he states that "education focuses on learning the enduring general principles that will inform good decision-making in a variety of contexts over long periods of time." While training on the other hand, he continues "involves much more task-specific instruction on "how to" types of issues, [tasks]."<sup>24</sup> Dorf indicates that there is a clear distinction between education and training as

concepts. Yet, confusion exists in military circles when discussing military education and training. The military tends to ignore education in favor of military training.<sup>25</sup> Military education has historically been vulnerable to a “flavor of the week” mentality.<sup>26</sup> It follows fads and is often reduced to lessons learned that can be presented as training. In the preface to *Military Education, Past, Present and Future*, editors Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson provide an interesting insight into the phenomenon and the consequences for military leadership when training outweighs education:

Most often, this is the result of those military officers entrusted with delivering professional military education not being capable of defining and implementing a true education system. Instead, the idea of training predominates, and the overall effort to educate in a “pure” fashion is eroded and compromised. The resulting product has often been an officer corps that has not functioned well in peace, in terms of being able to prepare for war, and has failed on the field of battle due to an inability to think effectively.<sup>27</sup>

The distinction between training and education can be defined simply as “a predictable response to a predictable situation” for the former and “a reasoned response to an unpredictable situation” for the latter.<sup>28</sup> Hence, it is always important to avoid the traditional tendency of preferring the action man over the contemplative one when discussion turns to weighing the balance of “brawn and brain” in the senior leaders.<sup>29</sup> As Sir William Butler warned “a nation which insists on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.”<sup>30</sup> Yet, despite the importance of education, one should also keep in mind the fact that societies do not offer an academic education to their militaries as a luxury. There is always a price to be paid, and in the case of military, this price is paid through the expense of more training. Finding the right balance and quality of military education and training is the best formulae to prepare an officer corps within budget constraints.

Thus, for a small country like Albania with relatively small Armed Forces, the system of military education should be built in a well thought-out and logical manner. Such a system must offer a clear and attractive career path from recruitment to retirement and a corresponding education program from pre-commissioning, through continuing military professional education, to the Defense Academy, at a cost the nation can afford, and yielding an officer corps that can address 21<sup>st</sup> century security interests.

A Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is an appropriate step to ensure education and training of a proper officer corps. As the Albanian Armed Forces’ proponent for military education, TRADOC will coordinate extensively with the AAF General Staff, specifically the Human Resources Management Directorate, J1, and Operations and Training, J3, to ensure

that education programs support current and future operational concepts and military personnel policies. The TRADOC can develop, recommend, and implement coherent education and training policies for a modernized force and officer corps.

#### Pre-Commissioning: A Joint Academy

The Albanian Armed Forces' (AAF) strategic goal is to become a small, qualitative and interoperable force, serving Albania's interests as part of the "functioning core." The AAF will transition over time to an officer corps educated and trained similar to their counterparts in NATO, the EU and PfP countries. Based on future threat analysis, the new missions for all services (Army, Air Force, and Navy) require more flexibility and jointness. This future demands transition to new and more appropriate organizations, equipment, and doctrine. All of this must be done within budget constraints. AAF cannot afford anymore to educate young officers at separate Service Military Academies. Therefore, pre-commissioning and education of young officers can best be completed at a Joint Military Academy or Military University, serving both mission and budget needs.<sup>31</sup>

The basic requirement for every officer candidate prior to commission must be to have acquired a bachelor degree. Within the countries of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, virtually none accept their newly commissioned officers into military service without a bachelor degree.<sup>32</sup> Officer expertise encompasses more than war-fighting. Education must begin with a broad, liberal, cultural background, and a founding in history, politics, economics, sociology, and the natural sciences. Such education allows the future officers to understand the profession's role within society.<sup>33</sup> In addition, competing career progression in a relatively small officer corps means modernized personnel management policies will make many officers confront retirement at a still active and productive age. Having at least an accredited degree (Master and PhD are possible further in career) and years of valuable and useful experience, the retiree will have a better chance to be integrated into the already "flooded market with degree holders."<sup>34</sup> Such opportunity encourages retention while it builds a quality corps.

A new Joint Military Academy/University should build on the best Albanian traditions and those of the most prestigious military academies in the world. The most important insight in establishing a new education system at this level is to share the philosophy of education with the best similar institutions. Studying and observing carefully the best models of military education in the Western Alliance and world-wide—US Military Academy at West Point, Virginia Military Institute, Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in United Kingdom, Royal Military Academy in Belgium, Accademia Militare at Modena in Italy, and National Defense Academy in

Japan—enable the Albanian Joint Military Academy/University (JMA/U) to share with them what is common to all, the main pillars of education.<sup>35</sup> The above mentioned military academies have proved very successful for a long period of time. Some of them have more than two hundred years of experience and have graduated great historic personalities that have helped to shape their epochs.<sup>36</sup> Following these proved patterns of military education at this level, JMAU will shape the new type of young officer with:

- A sound academic curriculum that will conclude with a fully accredited Bachelor Degree, similar to and competitive with those issued from the best civilian universities in Albania.
- An excellent and demanding Military Science (MS) program.
- A rich and competitive program in Physical Training and Sports.
- Character Building through day to day exposure with Cadet Corps experience.

In addition, the national goal of full membership in NATO and the Albanian individual Membership Action Plan (MAP) require a better command of the NATO operational language (English). The Albanian Joint Military Academy/University should offer a special program in English training, requiring NATO STANAG Level 2 proficiency upon graduation.

#### Admission to Joint Military Academy

Cadets entering the Joint Military Academy/University must have completed high school, and successfully pass an entrance examination, which includes academics, medical and physical screening. The academic examination for entering cadets will be equivalent to that of the University of Tirana. Cadets should select the Service in which they will serve throughout his/her career as an officer in their third year in the Joint Academy. Third year summer training, and the last year of studies before graduation, should be held at the appropriate Service School where students/cadets will complete an Officer Basic Course.

In order to retain young Officers who attend the Joint Military Academy/University, they should incur an active service obligation of two years for each year or partial year of study (active service repayment obligation is 2:1). The Ministry of Defense will enforce all laws regarding the active service commitments for graduates of the Joint Military Academy/University. Graduates who fail to report to training or duty following graduation will be prosecuted for the offense of desertion under Military Penal Code and will be required to repay all costs incurred by the Albanian Government.

Pre-commissioning: Officer Training Corps in Civilian Universities:

In addition to the JMA, an Officer Training Corps is appropriate. In conjunction with the Ministry of Education and Albanian civilian universities, the Ministry of Defense should develop an Officer Training Program to teach military arts and science as an optional part of the general educational program of civilian universities. This contingent of students will be required to have fulfilled the same criterion as graduates of the Joint Military University. This voluntary program will provide sufficient military specific education to permit students, who successfully complete both the military instruction and receive their university degree, to be appointed as officers in the active service with the rank of second lieutenant and to attend an Officer Basic Course according to service upon graduation. The Officer Training Corps supplements the officers drawn from the JMA, and provides a base of qualified officers in times of national emergency. For those who leave the service, it builds citizenship and trust.

Pre-commissioning: Officer Candidates from Civilian Institutions

In order to meet officer accession quotas, particularly in the technical and narrow professional specialties, the AAF should actively recruit selected civilian university graduates for entrance into the active military service as officers. Undergoing the same criterion of admission, they should have to attend an abbreviated one year course of instruction at the Joint Military Academy/University. During the course they will take Military Science and training as well as be actively involved in the Cadet Corps experience. After their commission they will attend OBC according to their Service and specialty. These officers can fill vacant positions not filled by other sources, and meet specialties and technical branch needs based on their civilian education.

**Continuing Professional Military Education and Training:** Continuing PME is important to officer development. Consequently, Training and Doctrine Command, in conjunction with Forces' Commands, should design and conduct military education and training courses in accordance with specific objectives for each Service and specialty. There should be a core curriculum for all officers of all services, plus branch/specialty and service specific education and training. Such opportunities in the officer military education and training system should consist of an Officer Basic Course, Officer Advanced Course, General Staff Officer Course, Senior Officer Course, and Seminars in Advanced Studies.

**Officer Basic Course:** Initial entry branch/specialty training will be conducted at the Troop/Service Schools for newly appointed second lieutenants and ensigns. This course will be the foundation of the branch/specialty military instruction required for junior officers at the

platoon and company level. The goal is to complete the officer basic course and initial entry training in a short period of time in order to move the new officers on to their first duty assignment. The duration of the basic course and branch/service specific training will normally not exceed one academic year. These courses prepare officers for initial duty assignments and appropriate basic leadership and management.

**Officer Advanced Course (OAC):** An OAC for all first lieutenants/lieutenants junior grade and captains/lieutenants with between four and seven years of active service should be conducted. This course will consist of a general military education core. The course will continue the officer's education in leadership and management, focus on the military tactics of battalions, and introduce the officer to staff skills. These staff skills include: oral and written communication, staff analysis, and the military decision making and planning processes. In addition, emphasis on the administration of military discipline and other subjects will be part of the curriculum. The common core course (phase one) should not exceed four months and may be followed by branch/service specific training (phase two) of not more than three months. The Officer Advanced Course curriculum will be developed by TRADOC to meet officer knowledge and skill requirements for this group.

#### Educating Future Senior Leaders – The Defense Academy

Senior leaders are a product of early education, career experience, and promotion and retention policies. But they are also a product of the specific education programs that seek to teach those senior leaders the required skills and competencies. Earlier in this paper, it was argued that an appropriate strategy to be followed by Albania in reforming its military education system was to follow the path of successful military educational programs and institutions of our NATO allies. This same argument is equally valid when it comes to discussion of the education of senior leaders. The Albanian Armed Forces, as a reflection of Albanian society and the political reform processes it is going through, need senior military leaders who understand the relationship between democratic governance on the one hand and national and regional security and stability on the other. The Albanian Defense Academy, being responsible for the education of senior military leaders, should seek to adopt an educational philosophy that establishes the habit of thinking about security issues in terms of grand strategy, and challenges students to appreciate the dynamics of today's security environment by using "the critical thinking tools needed by strategic leaders."<sup>37</sup> In that regard, the Albanian Defense Academy should incorporate an educational philosophy similar to the description given by Admiral Turner when he served as Commandant of US Naval War College:



As Oxford tried to teach us to look beyond the shrinking boundaries of right and wrong answers, so my staff and I (at the Naval War College) hoped to raise questions in the minds of our students which could never be resolved by the neat formulae for a shore bombardment or a submarine search pattern. As Oxford thrust upon us roles as philosophers and historians for which we may have been ill prepared, so we hoped to encourage new dimensions of thought upon our students.<sup>38</sup>

Such an approach can not be built from “old bricks and old woodwork.” It must look to the new materials of strategic skills and competencies, and transform both the curriculum and the students toward a new vision of leadership. In order to educate and prepare the new kind of senior military leader, the Albanian Defense Academy should revise the existing two-year course and offer two different courses responding to two distinct levels of leadership: the tactical level and the operational-strategic level.

**General Staff Officer Course:** A General Staff Officer Course is required for Majors/Lieutenant Commanders with between 11 and 15 years of active military service. Officers to attend this course should be selected in close cooperation with the Albanian MoD, General Staff J1, and TRADOC according to personnel management policies and performance criterion established for that purpose. The course will complete the tactical military education of the officers from all services (at brigade level and lower, or equivalent); continue their study of leadership, management, military history, and administration of military justice; and, introduce them to advanced staff procedures, operational art, civil-military operations, multi-national operations, national security and military strategy, the structure and functioning of the AAF General Staff, and the MOD, NATO, EU and PfP military structures, and functions. Additionally, attendees of this course will be required to improve their English language skills, which are essential for NATO, EU, and PfP assignments and missions. The course should not exceed one academic year. This course should be a requirement for career progression within the Albanian Armed Forces. Only officers who complete the General Staff Officer course should be considered for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, and flag ranks.

**Senior Officer Course:** This course is designed for promotable Lieutenant Colonels/Commanders and Colonels/Captains with 17 to 22 years of active military service. It prepares officers for service in positions of great responsibility at the highest levels. The High Career Commission in the Albanian MoD should select and invite officers to attend this course. The course completes the officers' formal military education in leadership, management, operational art, national security and military strategy, civil-military operations, multi-national operations (peacekeeping and peace enforcement), civil-military relations and the role of the

military in the civil society, military history, and programming, budgeting and procurement. The course will not exceed one academic year.

The course should contain a strong emphasis on research and writing as an important feature of senior military education. Despite legacies with old military tradition, where independent thought was not always welcome, it is the very nature of the military profession “whose *raison d’être* is closely tied to outwitting adversaries and grappling with uncertainty”<sup>39</sup> that demand military educational institutions develop critical thinking and the power of reflection and contemplation in students. The final “product” of this course should be a future senior leader (general/admiral) who can sit back and think not only realistically but critically and originally with a curiosity and imagination nurtured by a period of broad reading, research, writing, and trying out unorthodox ideas in the freedom of the classroom. The Albanian Armed Forces need future senior leaders who know how to deal with, influence and reach consensus in the more complex, interagency, and coalition policy formulation forums. Graduation from this course should fulfill the official academic requirements for awarding a Master Degree in Security and Strategic Studies.

The Albanian Defense Academy should also target a broader set of audiences. It should offer specific short courses and seminars in Advanced Defense Studies for Senior Colonels/Captains, Generals/Admirals, Senior Civilian Personnel, Government Officials, Members of Parliament, and other high level officials. The purpose of these seminars is to expose top-ranking civilians and military to some of the key issues that influence national, regional, and international security; the factors shaping national security strategy; and the imperatives of cooperative security in an interdependent world. They should offer a thought-provoking, intellectually challenging, and relevant program that will influence their future decision-making ability and strategic thinking. Such Defense Academy advanced seminars should be presented on an as required basis. Seminar length should be determined by the needs of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff of AAF, but normally would not exceed three months.

### Conclusions

Albania’s new future requires a new military leadership. Education is the center of gravity for transforming both the military and the senior leadership. Implementing the major objectives of Albanian NSS and NMS, in particular NATO and EU full membership, the Albanian Officer Education System should follow the patterns of officer military education of Euro-Atlantic Alliance nations while maintaining Albanian distinctness. Such an educational philosophy has

already proven successful in building an Officers' Corps in democratic societies, creating officers who serve their nations with loyalty and within the constitutional framework.

The steps to a new education system are clear but require new thinking. Key Albanian military educational institutions should be designed/shaped in a manner that will enable the formulation of a curriculum focused on how to think versus what to think. In that framework, most Albanian military officers will graduate and receive their commissions from a reformed Joint Military Academy/University. Others will enter the officer corps from diverse sources but acquiring an accredited Bachelor Degree is a necessary pre-requisite to commissioning as an officer in the Albanian Armed Forces. It is essential the newly established Training and Doctrine Command be consolidated as a joint institution that brings together training and education for all the Albanian Armed Forces. Such an Albanian TRADOC will be responsible to establish the standards of training and to design leadership development for continuing Professional Military Education and Training that elevates the quality of the new officer corps. Senior military leader education should be developed at a reformed Albanian Defense Academy through redesigned curriculums for tactical and strategic levels. The Albanian Defense Academy should focus on instilling in students the habit of thinking critically and the desire to read, research, and write on a broad spectrum of issues that are related to Albania's national security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In pursue of NSS objectives for NATO integration and interoperability, all levels of Albanian Officer Education and Training should enhance the foreign language training—most specifically English language proficiency as the NATO operational language. Such an ambitious reinvention of officer education will lead to senior military leaders that are prepared to protect and advance Albanian interests in the new security environment.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Maintaining Effective Deterrence* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: *Strategic Studies Institute Publication*, August 2003), 4.

<sup>2</sup> Tomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map, War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 4.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "It's a Flat World After All," *New York Time Magazine*, 3 April 2005, 35.

<sup>4</sup> Albanian Ministry of Defense, *The Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania* (Tirana, Albania: Publication of the Press and Information Directorate, July 2002), 13.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 19-20.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 4. This is "Presidential Statement", which serves as the introduction.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Colonel Stephen A. Shambach, ed, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: USAWC, 2004), 13-15.

<sup>10</sup> Harry R. Yarger, *Army Officer Personnel Management: The Creation of the Modern American System* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 1996), 529-530.

<sup>11</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1976), 102.

<sup>12</sup> Richard A. Chilcoat, "The 'Fourth' Army War College: Preparing Strategic Leaders for the Next Century", *Parameters* (Winter 1995-96), 3-17.

<sup>13</sup> Shambach,. These skills and competencies are developed through the whole "Strategic Leadership Primer."

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 2. In order to make a distinction between strategic level of leadership and tactical & operational levels, (the latter provided in the Army Field Manual 22-100) this book offers a change in the use of rubric Be, Know, Do. It uses The Master of Strategic Art that integrates and combines three Roles: Strategic Leader, Strategic Theorist, and Strategic Practitioner.

<sup>15</sup> The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs and the United States European Command, *The Republic of Albania – Defense Assessment* (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001), 82-85.

<sup>16</sup> Government of Albania, "Law for Higher Education in Albania 1999" (Tirana, Albania: Albanian Government Publications 1999).

<sup>17</sup> Sander Lleshi, "Perspectives to Military Education Development", Unpublished discussion held in Military Science Symposium, Tirana, October, 2001.

<sup>18</sup> Halit Daci, "The Impact of Democratic Changes in the Albanian Army," (June 1999); available from <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/daci.pdf>; Internet; accessed 8 January 2006.

<sup>19</sup> This insight is based on personal experience. The author of this paper is a graduate of Albanian General Staff Course.

<sup>20</sup> S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics*, (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1988), 77-83. In this book, Finer argues that military actions and behaviors in a society are related to the level of political culture of that society.

<sup>21</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *The Training of Officers-From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance* (New York, The Free Press, 1990), 103-104. In his book, Van Creveld offers an in-depth look into the Soviet system of officer training and education.

<sup>22</sup> "The Republic of Albania – Defense Assessment" 2001, 84. This assessment does not identify where these courses were conducted, only stating that "continuing professional education and training is conducted by the Defense Academy."

<sup>23</sup> *The Albanian Training and Doctrine Command Home Page*, available from <http://www.tradoc.mil.al/>; Internet; accessed 21 December 2005.

<sup>24</sup> Robert H. "Robin" Dorf, "Professional Military Security Education: The View from a Senior Service College," in *Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, James M. Smith, et. al. (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute Publications, July 2001), 29.

<sup>25</sup> John B Hattendorf, "The Conundrum of Military Education in Historical Perspective," in *Military Education, Past, Present, and Future*, eds., Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 1.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>27</sup> Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson, eds., *Military Education, Past, Present, and Future*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), ix.

<sup>28</sup> Timothy K. Nenninger, "Book Review: *Military Education, Past, Present, and Future*," *The Journal of Military History*, 67:4 (October 2003); [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 14 November 2005.

<sup>29</sup> Lloyd J. Matthews, "Anti-Intellectualism and the Army Profession," in *The Future of Army Profession*, 2 ed. Rev. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 61-92. See Correlli Barnett, "The Education of Military Elites," *Journal of Contemporary History*, (July 1967): 16, 18. Quoted by Matthews in the above article in page 62 with this full quote: "Their traditions were against books and study and in favor of a hard gallop, a gallant fight, and a full jug... The preference for character over intellect, for brawn over brain, has always taken the form of denigration of the staff college graduate and apotheosis of that splendid chap, the regimental officer."

<sup>30</sup> A.J. Barrett "The Canadian Experiment in Continuing Professional Military Education", Panel on Strategic Studies, Washington DC. May, 2001; available from <http://www.pfpconsortium.org.>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Albanian Military University started its activity in September 2004 as a Joint Military Academy with a new curriculum that offers an accredited Bachelor Degree. For detailed information see *Albanian Military University Home Page*, available from <http://www.uus-edu-alb.net/>; Internet; accessed 20 December 2005.

<sup>32</sup> *The United States Military Academy Home Page*, available from <http://www.usma.edu/>; *The Royal Military College of Canada Home Page*, available from <http://www.rmc.ca/>; *The Royal Military Academy of Belgium Home Page*, available from <http://www.rma.ac.be/>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2005. *The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Home Page*, available from <http://www.atra.mod.uk/atra/rmas/>; *The National defense Academy of Japan Home Page*, available from <http://www.nda.ac.jp/>; Internet; accessed 18 December 2005.

<sup>33</sup> James M. Smith, *Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century International Security Environment* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute Publications, July 2001), 9.

<sup>34</sup> Van Creveld, 72.

<sup>35</sup> *The United States Military Academy Home Page*, The Royal Military College of Canada Home Page, *The Royal Military Academy of Belgium Home Page*, *The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Home Page*, *The National Defense Academy of Japan Home Page*,

<sup>36</sup> *The United States Military Academy Home Page*. Ulysses S. Grant, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Robert E. Lee, and Douglas Mac Arthur were graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

<sup>37</sup> William T. Johnsen, et.al., "The Army War College: Educating Strategic Leaders in an Age of Uncertainty," in *Educating Leaders in an Age of Uncertainty: The Future of Military War Colleges* (2004-2005 Report to the Smith-Richardson Foundation), 30.

<sup>38</sup> Quoted by Hattendorf in his article "The Conundrum of Military Education in Historical Perspective" 10.

<sup>39</sup> Gregory D. Foster, "Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 1996): 111-115.